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A double edged sword: the increasing diversity of deliberative 
democracy 
 
STEPHEN ELSTUB 
School of Social Science, University of Paisley 
His main interests lie in the theory and practice of democracy, especially deliberative 
democracy. Within this area he has worked primarily on issues relating to 
institutionalisation of deliberative democracy as its approximation within different 
levels of the policy process. Edinburgh University Press will publish his first book, 
entitled Towards a Deliberative and Associational Democracy, in 2007. 
 
Abstract 
 
As the theory of deliberative democracy becomes increasingly popular, it also becomes 
an increasingly diverse and flexible theory. This diversity could be a double edged 
sword; on the one hand this dexterity enables deliberative democracy to become more 
engrossing, comprehensive and relevant to more and more democratic, philosophical 
and practical issues. On the other hand deliberative democracy can start to be everything 
to everyone and lose an essence and core set of ideas. The paper highlights the diversity 
deliberative democracy is gaining in areas of justification, on the nature of public reason 
and over mechanisms for institutionalisation. Although the paper accepts that 
deliberative democracy is necessarily an ‘essentially contested concept’ and 
‘morphological’ it also attempts to offer a broad and loose core to provide some 
boundaries to interpretations, to prevent the theory becoming meaningless though 
diversity. 
 
Introduction 
 
The theory of deliberative democracy has begun to dominate the literature on 
democratic theory from enthusiasts and critics, establishing itself as a mature and 
complex theory of democracy. It offers a critique of existing democracy, has distinct 
normative elements and has gained credibility as an ideal to be approximated. Through 
this process the theory has developed an ever-increasing diversity of strands and 
tendencies, which, although are not entirely exclusive (as key features are shared and 
many crossovers can be identified), do, at times, pull in different directions, making 
deliberative theory increasingly deep, complex, muddled, ambiguous, with much scope 
for disagreement. Moreover, as the theory of deliberative democracy matures, gains 
credence, popularity and addresses a broader range of issues it increases in complexity 
and diversity. This diversity could be a double edged sword for the theory of 
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deliberative democracy; on the one hand it’s dexterity should be welcomed and praised 
because, as it becomes a more multifaceted theory, it will also become more engrossing, 
comprehensive and relevant to more and more democratic, philosophical and practical 
issues. On the other hand it can start to be everything to everyone and lose an essence 
and core set of ideas.   
 
An initial indicator of this great diversity is demonstrated through its relevance to a 
range of ideologies. Its relevance to republicanism derives from a mutual commitment 
to participation in debate to resolve political and moral disputes aimed at advancing the 
common good.1 Liberals are in accord with deliberative democrats as they see positive 
rights such as political participation, association and speech as essential to democracy, 
which can lead to individual development or represent a fair and/ or ‘neutral’ set of 
procedures for decision-making. Socialists share with deliberative democracy the 
rejection of the validity of the neo-liberal conception of politics as the satisfaction of 
pre-political, private, fixed and individual preferences.2 Furthermore many deliberative 
theorists adopt a quasai-Marxist approach, aiming to ensure that collective decision-
making is ‘uncontaminated by the principles that regulate the market.’3 
Environmentalists see deliberative democracy as a promising method to enhance public 
issues such as the environment and therefore enhance environmental rationality, as it is 
thought that deliberative democracy will encourage citizens to reflect on their 
dependence upon each other and the environment. 4, 5,6, ,7 Finally feminists and 
mulitculturalists applaud deliberative democracy’s aim to include all social groups in 
dialogue.8,9,10 
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The main aim of this paper is to clearly set out the lines of conflict and agreement, 
highlighting the extent of the disagreements and demonstrating the diversity of 
deliberative democracy. Furthermore, it will try and (re)establish a loose set of core, but 
contested principles of deliberative democracy in an attempt to hold back the increasing 
avalanche of diverse and tenuous interpretations of the concept. In doing this, the article 
is inevitably selective and does not cover all strands and points of dispute within the 
theory. Moreover, the debates and strands are only outlined, but key texts and theorists 
are covered to enable the reader to explore these issues further. The areas of diversity 
that will be considered are over justification, the nature and value of public reason, and 
the most appropriate mechanism for institutionalisation. Firstly, it is import to start from 
the core of deliberative democracy, the necessary source of agreement between all who 
consider themselves deliberative theorists.  
 
The core of deliberative democracy 
 
Although democracy essentially means ‘rule by the people’, the ‘meanings’ of 
democracy have varied considerably and been interpreted in many different ways over 
its long history.11 In fact Saward even suggests that ‘democracy is the contest over its 
meaning’.12 This is because ‘it is a concept before it is a fact’ and concepts tend not to 
have a ‘single and agreed meaning.’ All of which suggests it is an ‘essentially 
contestable concept’.13 Aspects of the deliberative theory are present in many of these 
changing interpretations, but in essence, the theory is a statement on the ‘true’ meaning 
of democracy in the modern age and, in particular, provides a critique of the dominant 
conception of democracy found in modern liberal democracies. If democracy is an 
essentially contestable concept, which changes over time, then deliberatively democracy 
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will be too.14 Nor should we want it’s meaning to become static, fixed, or reified, as this 
would remove its contingent ability to develop and adapt in line with changing 
circumstances. In this sense deliberative democracy perhaps should be interpreted and 
defined, in the same manner as Freeden has interpreted ideologies, as ‘morphological’.15 
However, as with all political concepts this does not mean all meanings ascribed to 
deliberative democracy are equally legitimate. In short there must be ‘boundaries’ to 
valid interpretations, but these boundaries must be dynamic and flexible.16 Arblaster17 
argues that democracy does have boundaries, with a single, yet vague and general 
thread of meaning. This ensures varied and competing meanings can legitimately exist, 
but that there is also a core to prevent a descent into complete relativism. I suggest that 
the same interpretation can be applied to deliberative democracy and that it is in danger 
of losing its core under the current avalanche of interpretations, which are not only 
moving, but also destroying these boundaries.  
 
At this moment a vague and loose core can be identified. It includes; ‘democracy’ and 
‘deliberation.’ The democratic part is collective decision-making through the 
participation of all relevant actors. When interpreting the definition of democracy, a key 
problem is what kind of participation is envisaged for the people. For deliberative 
democrats the answer is in the deliberative strand and participation should be the give-
and-take of rational arguments,18 with a reason being ‘a consideration that counts in 
favour of something: in particular, a belief, or action’.19  
 
The deliberative strand can therefore be described as; ‘a dialogical process of 
exchanging reasons for the purpose of resolving problematic situations that cannot be 
settled without interpersonal co-ordination and co-operation’.20 Deliberative theorists 
                                       The increasing diversity of deliberative democracy  
 
5 
believe that preferences will adapt to reason, conceiving preferences as being 
exogenous; formed during the political process rather than prior to it.  Through 
consideration of differing reasons, existing preferences can be transformed and new 
preferences formed. Elster considers preference transformation to be the defining mark 
of deliberative democracy: ‘The transformation of preferences through rational 
deliberation is the ostensible goal of arguing’.21 Therefore in order for deliberation to 
occur, ‘reflection upon preferences in non-coercive fashion’ is required. This 
deliberation is democratic if these reflective preferences influence collective decisions 
and all have had an opportunity to deliberate equally.22  
 
Therefore, deliberative democracy seems to have a general core, which includes: 
 
 the making of collective decisions  
 involving the participation of relevant actors (the more equal this participation 
the more democratic) 
 through the consideration and exchange of reasons 
 aimed at the trans(formation) of preferences  
 
This broad conception of the two components of democratic deliberation is accepted by 
most within the tradition; but is still contested causing important disputes and 
contributing to the dynamism of the theory, however in the case of some the 
contestation leads to an excessive elasticity of this core.  
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Justifications of deliberative democracy 
 
One of the most significant divides within deliberative democracy derives from 
alternative justifications. Three prominent justifications of deliberative democracy will 
be outlined in turn: the prudential justification, the epistemic justification and the fair 
procedure justification. These justifications are often cited to justify democracy in 
general, but the deliberative theorists make the case that not any theory of democracy 
will suffice because deliberative democracy can best promote these political values. 
Consequently, the justifications focus on what deliberation contributes to democracy. 
 
The prudential justification 
 
According to this justification, deliberative democracy is good because it enables ‘each 
participant to gain an equally clear and reflective understanding of his ideas and 
interests.’23 No participant can predict what all participants’ opinions would be or know 
all the information relevant to a decision.24 Through debate this information is made 
public and preferences can be revised in light of it.25 Deliberative democracy can 
therefore help to overcome inequalities between citizens with respect to information and 
rationality.26 It also provides participants with the opportunity to question the 
information and arguments that have been put forth by partisan sources, and form and 
enter into debate with their own information and arguments in a manner that is 
persuasive to others, which will further help them gain a clearer understanding of their 
own beliefs and preferences. The information provided in the discussion, from the 
various participants, may also have some direct bearing on the outcomes of the various 
choices, which could, would or should have an effect on what decision the collective 
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makes. The suggestion is then that deliberative democracy makes individuals and 
collectives more prudential. 
 
This justification is not without its problems, as it seems impossible for all relevant and 
available information to be perfectly disseminated to all citizens in modern complex 
societies, because democratic deliberation can only ever increase access to available 
information. Due to the exigency of time, decisions cannot be put on hold until all 
information has been disseminated. We therefore face the problem of where the trade-
off between gathering information and making the decision should be made and perhaps 
deliberation must proceed with the understanding that in the future, information may 
come to light that could change the participants’ preferences. Consequently, the 
capacity for deliberative democracy to enhance the prudence of individuals and 
collectives is always limited. 
 
The epistemic justification 
 
In this republican orientated justification, deliberative democracy is good because it is 
the best method of producing good decisions. If another method of decision-making 
were more reliable at achieving this, deliberative democracy would be unnecessary.27 
However, the argument is that deliberative democracy is the most reliable method 
because, by generating public reason, it can lead to decisions that are true, well justified 
or commensurate with justice, needs or the common good.28,29,30,31However, it is not 
clear how we know that deliberative democracy does produce decisions that promote 
the common good. If we could test this justification it would mean another method for 
identifying the common good existed and, therefore, deliberative democracy would not 
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be required. It is also reliant upon there being a ‘real truth’ about the common good,32 
something, which is contested by many, including deliberative theorists.33 Warren 
argues that this is not even a justification of deliberative democracy, but only republican 
democracy for three reasons: Firstly, because deliberative democracy does not presume 
‘that outcomes can or should be measured according to an ideal of the common good.’34 
Secondly because not all goods are common e.g. material goods and intimacy, but are 
still the target of political dispute that should be resolved through deliberative 
democracy, which republican theories of democracy fail to account for.35 Finally, 
because if there is continuing disagreement after a period of deliberation, the minority 
will still deny the correctness of the decision and therefore not feel obligated by it. 
Focusing on the common goods therefore removes the incentive to compromise for 
those with incompatible conceptions of the common good.36,37 
  
The fair procedure justification 
 
This justification is opposed to the epistemic one, as it is based on the idea that there is 
no external good by which to judge decisions and that it is fair procedures that enable 
conflicts over the common good to be debated and resolved.38 Therefore, the resulting 
decisions in deliberative democracy will be ‘just’ because they are derived from fair 
procedures in which all have been able to participate equally, regardless of what the 
actual decision is.39 It is evident that all can participate equally in purely aggregative 
decision-making methods, so the proceduralists must make the further claim that public 
reason increases the fairness of the procedure by encouraging participants to consider 
the preferences of others and this improves ‘the quality of preferences, opinions and 
reasons’. This then takes the proceduralists towards either the prudentialist justification 
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if the preferences are better informed due to these procedures or the epistemic approach 
if the claim is that these preferences are likely to be correct due to these procedures 
see.40,41 
 
This justification is considered excessively relativist as it fails to account for why the 
decisions that result from the ideal procedures of deliberative democracy are ‘correct’ 
and based upon ‘good’ or ‘compelling’ reasons.42 Without good reasons, why should 
the decision that has been produced by deliberatively democratic procedures be selected 
over any of the other available options? It would be just as fair to select an option 
randomly by a coin toss or through a vote.43,44 In contrast, proceduralism is classified as 
not neutral at all, but as based on and promoting a particular set of values.45 
 
There is a significant diversity of justifications of deliberative democracy, but these 
justifications are congruent with the core of deliberative democracy as it has been 
outlined here. Nevertheless, the generation of public reason is central to all these 
justifications, and the diversity of interpretations significantly threaten the dilution of 
this core. 
 
The nature of public reason 
 
Within the theory of deliberative democracy, it is agreed that, reason should be made 
public, but what this requires is disputed, such as over whether public reason can be 
produced privately or only collectively, if the reasons offered need to be compelling to 
all to be public, if a consensus is likely and desirable, if other forms of communication 
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other than reason should be included, and if certain types of reason should be excluded 
from debates altogether. 
 
Collective or private deliberation? 
 
The ‘rule of publicity’ was a cornerstone of Kant’s philosophy and ‘transcendental 
formula of public law’, which stated that to be right an action that relates to the rights of 
others must be compatible with being made public.46 By this maxim, collective 
decisions must be made public. Kant’s publicity principle has had a profound influence 
on Rawls and Habermas and their lineage of deliberative democrats, but they offer 
differing interpretations of Kant’s ‘transcendental formula’. Rawls47 perceives it as a 
hypothetical publicity test, suggesting that if a law or policy is to be right, it must have 
the capacity to endure publicity. Even if this is the correct interpretation of Kant’s 
philosophy, Habermas seems to be right in claiming that laws and policies must actually 
be made and tested through rational public debate, as we have no other way of knowing 
if the policies have the capacity of being public.48 In line with Habermas’ interpretation 
democratic deliberation is generally considered to be a joint, collective activity yet 
following in the Rawlsian tradition, both Goodin and Gundersen envisage democratic 
deliberation as being desirable and possible outside of collective debate.  
 
The differences between collective and private deliberative theorists derive from 
different views on the nature of public reason. To be ‘public’ (for both groups) the 
reasons offered must be understandable and acceptable to all citizens or at least 
potentially so.49 However, the private deliberationists see reason as ‘singular’, meaning 
that all will reason in the same way, negating the need for others to be present.50  
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Therefore, individual citizens must consciously adopt public reason, rather than it being 
generated by the presence of others.51 In contrast, for the collective deliberationists, it is 
the very presence of other citizens that will encourage people to think ‘publicly’, the 
idea being that selfish reasons of the type ‘I agree with this because it will really benefit 
me, but disadvantage others’ will be unconvincing to others and participants in a 
deliberative debate will want to convince others to gain support for their proposals. 
Collective deliberation therefore encourages people to focus on public values in order 
for their arguments to persuade people of the validity of their ideas.52,53,54 Included in 
the process of collective deliberation will be those who would be disadvantaged from 
these selfish preferences, making it very difficult to justify these prejudices to these 
people.  However, it is not just the fact that others will have a vote that will encourage 
participants to offer public reasons, but because one will also ‘internalise’ the norms of 
publicity through feeling ashamed or repulsed at the ‘inappropriateness of certain styles 
of argument in the public forum.’55 
 
Individual deliberation is structurally different as it contains no dialogue, no give-and-
take of reasons and no influence between actors.56 Goodin57 suggests this can occur 
because others can be made ‘imaginatively present’ through individuals conducting ‘a 
wide ranging debate within their heads.’ Yet this conception of deliberative democracy 
is difficult to distinguish from an aggregative view of democracy as citizens can 
deliberate in private prior to voting58 and he therefore accepts collective deliberation 
will still be necessary as we can never know the views of others; so some will be 
misportrayed, others completely ignored and few put as persuasively as they would be 
by the agent themselves.59  
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Gundersen advocates ‘dyadic’ deliberation in his ‘Socratic theory’. Groups could still 
assemble to make collective decisions, but communication between them would always 
be dyadic with ‘serial one-to-one encounters.’60 According to Gundersen, the first 
advantage of dyadic deliberation over collective deliberation is that it is easier to 
institutionalise.61 This may be the case, but unless it can generate the same or preferable 
normative consequences, it only stands if deliberative democracy is impossible to 
institutionalise otherwise collective deliberation should be pursued. However, 
Gundersen claims dyadic deliberation is normatively superior to the collective 
alternative, as the relationship between participants is more interactive and therefore 
‘allows each partner to more easily ascertain the other’s knowledge and interests’, 
making clarification much easier because in a group this would require the 
monopolisation of debate between two people.62 This seems uncertain because there 
may be more than one misunderstanding, sharing similarities with others.  A debate 
about clarification could therefore take place between more than two participants and 
aid the understanding of many participants.  Gundersen also suggests that dyadic 
communication will mean greater equality between participants than in collective 
deliberation because power in dyadic relationships is easier to challenge verbally and 
exit is also easier.63 This claim may be true in some cases, but certainly not in all.  There 
are certain dyadic relationships where it is harder to challenge power verbally and exit is 
even harder than in collective debate; it seems to depend upon context.  For example, a 
dyadic relationship may be dominated by one of the participants if the other holds them 
in high esteem, with excessive respect, or is intimidated and fearful of them.  This of 
course can occur in collective deliberation, but other participants would be present to 
challenge the esteemed or feared figure with reasons.  Alternatively, two people may 
find it very hard to respect deliberative procedures because of the mutual disrespect they 
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feel towards each other, but these feelings may be calmed by the presence of other 
participants debating.  
 
The main problem though is that dyadic deliberation cannot generate public reason in 
the same manner as collective deliberation. Elster suggests that pure aggregation of 
preferences (and the argument could be applied to private deliberation) confuses the 
type of behaviour that is apt in the market place and the forum.  In the market the 
consumer can be sovereign because the different choices will only affect the consumer.  
This is not the case when making collective political decisions, as many of the citizens’ 
preferences may be defective64 and need to be justified to the rest of the polity, as the 
agents are not just deciding for themselves.65 If private, this deliberation does not open 
people up to the arguments of others, or force people to defend their choice. If dyadic, 
people only hear the reasons of one other at anyone time, and do not hear the exchange 
of reasons between others, and these could cause change in their own preferences. 
 
If deliberative democracy is to promote public reason and contribute to the normative 
values outlined it seems apparent that it must be collective and a debate must actually 
occur. Those who envisage hypothetical debate and solo deliberation are stretching the 
core of deliberative democracy too far. 
 
Universal or specific reasons? 
 
An established assumption, within deliberative democracy, is that deliberators should be 
critically detached, and offer universal reasons that could convince everyone. For Cohen 
this is essential if the reasons are to be public.66 However, this is a very demanding 
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requirement, especially in plural societies, and in reality, rather than offering reasons 
that are convincing to all, people may offer reasons that are aimed at a majority, or the 
largest minority.67 If this occurs then the reasons are not genuinely public and could 
even reflect the selfish interests of the majority. One suggested solution is that 
deliberative democracy should aim to lead to a result ‘that enjoys the widest possible 
support’, not just majority support.68 
 
It cannot be expected that the same reasons will convince all citizens of a certain 
decision. Psychological research has indicated that reflective preference transformation 
will be limited because people are unresponsive to reasons that do not support their 
preconceptions of an issue. This might explain why different people will look at the 
same piece of evidence and use it to support their own distinct interests.69  Therefore 
‘the force of an argument is always relative’70,71 and if rational arguments are to 
persuade an agent of a new belief, they must start by appealing to their present beliefs.72 
Consequently, participants in debate will offer different reasons to persuade different 
citizens of the need for the same outcome and therefore will not be public in the way 
envisioned by some deliberative theorists.73 This does not mean deliberators can offer 
any reason they think will be convincing to someone as they must, at the very least, not 
contradict the reasons they have offered to others. Otherwise they would be found to be 
insincere and willing to say anything to anyone to ensure their preferences prevail in the 
final decision. This advantage is specific to collective deliberation as in ‘dyadic’ 
deliberation there would be nothing to ensure this civilising force of hypocrisy.  
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Consensus or disagreement? 
 
Due to the potential of deliberative democracy to generate public reason with 
participants trying to find reasons that are convincing to all, Cohen74 and Habermas75 
believe that a consensus would eventually be achieved. They suggest that public reason 
would mean people taking on board a common interest over their private or selfish 
interests as arguments must be based on the reasons that a proposal will be good for all 
and will encourage people to identify with each other and the collective as a whole. If 
deliberation continued long enough, all would come to agree on the same common 
interest. However, there are a number of reasons to suggest that consensus would not be 
achieved. 
 
A key democratic requirement of the ideal of deliberative democracy is that all should 
be included in deliberation but more participants often leads to more opinions, making 
agreement harder to achieve, especially if some of these are previously unheard.76 
Debate can also increase disagreement as well as reduce it. A collective could easily 
have a general agreement on some issue, but a debate could generate a greater diversity 
of opinions on an issue as it is explored more extensively and deeply.77,78,79,80,81 It is 
further suggested that there are a ‘plurality of ultimate values.’ People believe in totally 
different ideas of ‘the good life’ and are therefore too different, making agreement on 
ultimate values impossible. This factor is magnified in modern cosmopolitan societies 
where there is a mixture of cultures.82,83 It therefore seems unlikely that consensus will 
be achieved, which Cohen84 and Habermas85 do accept, but both still maintain that 
consensus should still remain the ideal guiding discussion.   
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The agonistic branch of deliberative democracy is not concerned by differences 
persisting, but rather praises differences as an essential resource for democratic 
deliberation, without which the deliberative process would be redundant.86 Agonistics 
reject the idea that consensus on the common good is the sole aim of deliberation; they 
fear that the ‘common good’ might not be common at all, but simply a perpetuation of 
inequality and that consensus might be achieved due to acquiescence to power rather 
than being rationally motivated with participants feeling pressurised to conform.87,88,89,90 
It is suggested that dominant social and economic groups are at an advantage because 
they can put forward their preferences and opinions as ‘authoritative knowledge’ and 
their interests as neutral and in the process devalue those with alternative beliefs, 
preferences and interests.91 If a consensus is not required or sought then continued 
disagreement would not be discouraged and therefore less pressure will be exerted on 
subordinate groups to conform. 
 
It seems, then, that consensus is not possible and perhaps not desirable. If this is the 
case, it is apparent that in order for decisions to be made deliberation can only ever 
support the aggregation of preferences and not replace it altogether.92,93,94  
 
Reasons and rhetoric 
 
It is suggested that deliberative democracy can contribute to political equality through 
its generation of public reasoning, because it makes it more difficult for powerful 
groups to serve their particular interests as deliberation can expose this self-interest that 
it is in the powerful groups interest to hide and disguise.95 This assertion is disputed 
because it is claimed deliberative democracy relies upon forms of communication that 
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privilege those already dominant, resulting in their gaining unequal influence in the 
deliberative settings that is not derived from the ‘force of the better argument’ and 
therefore reinforces rather than reduces political inequality. 
 
Specifically, it is suggested the capabilities required to participate effectively in 
democratic deliberation are not neutral. For example the language required, the 
formality of the debate and the rationalism will favour dominant social groups like 
white middle-class men,96 who are also likely to speak more in discussion and gain 
undue influence not based upon the quality of their reasons.97 Due to ‘insidious 
prejudices’, which ensure the arguments of minority, social groups will not be ‘heard’; 
these prejudices will go unnoticed and therefore will not be countered by reasons 
offered in deliberation.98 Many of these claims have been disputed, at least to the degree 
suggested by Young and Sanders.99,100,101  
 
Young102 therefore suggests debate should not privilege the articulation of reasons 
above other forms of communication. She advocates ‘communicative democracy’, 
which she suggests will differ from deliberative democracy by favouring greeting, 
rhetoric and storytelling over rational argument.  She argues that this will make 
communication more compatible with pluralism because these forms of communication 
are more amenable to the particularity of participants. ‘Greeting’ deals with how 
participants provide recognition amongst one another and is said to be important as it 
creates the right atmosphere for deliberation and can indicate a mutual respect.  
‘Rhetoric’ is the use of cultural symbols and values, which can provoke and motivate 
participants, playing a key role in getting issues on the agenda.  ‘Storytelling’ or 
‘testimony’ is the use of narratives, personal or otherwise, and claimed to be essential, 
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as people need to share their personal experiences to highlight and demonstrate their 
specific position. 
 
Many deliberative democrats have accepted that greeting, rhetoric and storytelling could 
and should play a part in deliberation, but have further responded by highlighting the 
fact that these communicative aspects are as hierarchical as the rational aspects of 
deliberation criticised by Young.  Just as some people are better at forming, expressing 
and understanding rational argument than others, so some people will have more talent 
for greeting, rhetoric and storytelling.  Moreover, the people who have talents for these 
things may be those from the same dominant social groups who are talented 
arguers.103,104,105,106 In addition the inclusion of emotions can be hazardous and lead to 
inequality. For example the ‘emotional culture’ of a deliberating group can lead to 
inequality in opportunities to participate effectively in debate and silence certain 
members and therefore emotion in deliberative debate should be present, but 
contained.107 Nor can these forms of communication seem to replace the need, or even 
central role of reason. The justification behind prioritising reason is that preferences 
should be justified when making collective decisions and although these other forms of 
communication fulfil important functions conducive to deliberation only reason can 
achieve this  
 
The scope of reason 
 
There are two different strategies to restrict the range of admissible preferences, based 
upon Goodin’s108 distinction between output filters and input filters. Output filters 
remove certain options through the process of decision-making, while input filters 
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prevent certain preferences from being considered and entered into the decision-making 
process in the first place. Input filters resemble Rawls’ belief that democratic 
deliberation should not adapt to pluralism as it stands, but to ‘reasonable pluralism.’ 
Output filters reflect a Habermasian line, presuming reasonable pluralism can be 
achieved through the deliberative process itself and therefore no views should be 
excluded prior to the deliberative process. 
 
Goodin argues that input filtering is a more efficient way of excluding irrational or 
misguided preferences entering than output filtering, as they do not enter the decision-
making process and so they do not influence participants at any stage.  Consequently he 
suggests preferences should be laundered by elites prior to debate. Gutmann and 
Thompson109are also in favour of input filters to prevent the inclusion of preferences 
that challenge political equality. Despite being committed to the deliberative theory of 
democracy, they want to achieve the value of publicity, prior to the deliberation process, 
obviously being sceptical of its ability to ensure public reason though its internal 
processes of debate. Similarly Miller110 and Blaug,111 believe that certain reasons e.g. 
racist arguments or violent and coercive threats should be excluded a priori, in order to 
be in line with the requirements of deliberation that require participants to be free and 
equal, and to further ensure the deliberative capacities of individuals are not damaged 
through intimidation. It seems evident that threats of violence and coercion must be 
ruled out as this would mean that force itself and not the force of the better argument 
would be successful.  The exclusion of reasons, even if they are racist, sexist, sectarian 
or homophobic etc seems less certain. 
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Input filtering seems undemocratic, unnecessary, and anti-deliberation. Firstly, input 
filtering leads to an ever-increasing number of issues excluded from the agenda which 
can mean that ‘too many issues will form the background framework of public 
deliberation rather than its subject matter’112 making deliberative resolution of these key 
conflicts impossible.113 Therefore, not only is the deliberative scope reduced, but also 
the democratic scope of decision-making. Secondly, deliberative democracy can 
transform preferences by exposing them to reason, new information and encouraging 
preferences to be justified to the rest of the collective:  
 
‘Politics in the participatory mode does not choose between or merely ratify 
values whose legitimacy is a matter of prior record.  It makes preferences 
and opinions earn legitimacy by forcing them to run the gauntlet of public 
deliberation and public judgment.  They emerge not simply legitimized, but 
transformed by the process to which they have been subjected.’113 
 
Consequently, Cohen states that; ‘what is good is fixed by public deliberation and not 
prior to it’ and ‘for this reason the deliberative conception supports protection for the full 
range of expression, regardless of the content of that expression.114,115 Sher agrees, 
arguing that it is unnecessary to apriorially restrict the agenda as the relevant distinction 
is between good and bad reasons, not legitimate and illegitimate ones. Not all reasons 
will carry the same force e.g. racist reasons are inadequate reasons: ‘Indeed, to show that 
a form of discrimination is illegitimate, the best strategy is publicly to consider, and 
decisively to refute, the best arguments advanced on its behalf.’116,117 However, for 
Goodin, the exclusion of certain opinions is necessary not because they might be 
successful and present in the final decision (he is confident about the role of public 
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reason preventing this), but because they are offensive, morally wrong and therefore 
should not even be discussed.118 
 
Even if this is the case, there is the further problem of implementation; if input filtering is 
to be implemented democratically then all relevant actors should be included. 
Deliberative democrats could not consistently accept that citizen’s pre-political 
preferences should determine the basis of censorship, which would therefore mean the 
need for a debate between all these actors, where no reasons could be apriorially 
excluded. However if elites impose input filters, as Goodin suggests, they could 
potentially control the agenda, and therefore politics itself,119 by excluding ideas that 
they did not like, or that challenged their power just as anti-racist, feminist, pro-
homosexual, socialist, environmentalist and libertarian views have been labelled 
offensive and morally wrong in the past and even today.  If we want new and distinctive 
ideas to be incorporated into the public sphere, then we cannot allow any ideas to be 
formally excluded as ideas that challenge powerful groups and threaten the status quo 
could be excluded along with exclusive and prejudiced discourses. Therefore if a 
deliberative democracy is to hold true to both its deliberative and democratic strands then 
no reason should be formally excluded from debate and the domain of preferences should 
be restricted through the process of deliberation itself 
 
Institutionalising deliberative democracy  
 
Democratic principles are ‘enacted’ through institutional mechanisms120 and therefore 
the significance of the theoretical debates over the nature of public reason is clearly 
highlighted when we consider the institutionalisation of deliberative democracy. Not 
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that all deliberative democrats believe the theory can or should be institutionalised, 
perceiving it instead as a critique of actual democratic processes. However, many 
believe it is a theory that should be approximated and attention to this issue has in turn 
rapidly increased the diversity of deliberative democracy with a myriad of mechanisms 
advocated. These include constitutional mechanisms, political parties, citizen juries, 
deliberative opinion polls, and civil society with each mechanism approximating and 
enacting different aspects of the ideal in a variety of ways.  
 
Constitutional mechanisms 
 
A key trend in deliberative theory is the belief that deliberative democracy should only 
be employed when forming the constitution, suggesting this would lead to a constitution 
that all could accept.121  However, this would mean that deliberative democracy would 
not be employed for specific decisions, which is a huge step away from the democratic 
core of the theory.  
 
Others, such as Madison see the constitution as a useful tool to ensure decisions are 
made deliberatively in deliberative legislative arenas.122 Similarly Bessette, argues that 
the American Constitution ensures Congress’ decisions are commensurate with public 
reasons.123 The USA’s Senate is in fact not even directly elected partly to ensure good 
deliberation, but rendering it undemocratic.124 Elkin125 further questions its deliberative 
capacities, with a focus on the public interest lost due to representatives asserting the 
interests of their home districts or pressure groups. In such arrangements decisions are 
made by elites and therefore excludes many from participating in deliberation and 
therefore ‘ties deliberation to a needlessly thin conception of democracy’126 and 
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therefore fails to approximate the deliberative ideal closely provoking Warren to 
discount advocates of such mechanisms as not being deliberative theorists.127 This 
mechanism therefore does not have a sufficient level of citizen participation to 
approximate deliberative democracy 
 
For Dryzek by limiting deliberation within and/or about constitutional structure, liberal 
constitutionalists fail to acknowledge that structural economic forces and their 
accompanying ideologies and discourses, generated in a capitalist economy, and not just 
constitutions, will determine the nature of, and distort, deliberation. Moreover, only 
some of the distortions created by inequality can be overcome by legal and 
constitutional arrangements. Consequently, he suggests it is necessary to radically 
reform the current liberal state and generate alternative venues for deliberation, where 
more radical and critical discourses can develop.128 
 
Political parties 
 
Political parties have been seen as an appropriate location because they are essential 
to setting the agenda for debate in contemporary democracies. Realistic democratic 
deliberation requires a reduction of possibilities to be discussed and parties do this 
effectively by raising well-defined issues for debate.129,130 Advocates of this 
institutional method see deliberative democracy as promoting universal reasons and 
political parties are thought to be good at this as they focus on the common good and 
therefore escape the narrow, local, sectional and issue-specific interests that these 
deliberative democrats are attempting to eliminate.131 
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However, in order to ensure a good level of citizen participation political parties 
must be democratised around the norms of deliberation,132 something that has long 
been considered impossible due to the inevitability of hierarchy.133 There is also the 
problem that in general elections, parties would be granted power by citizens who 
may not have good reasons to support their vote as it would be based on pre-political 
preferences that had not ‘run the gauntlet’ of ‘genuine’ democratic 
deliberation.134,135 
 
Representation by lot 
 
A rejuvenation of the Athenian method of representation by lot is the focus for those 
advocating deliberative opinion polls and citizen juries. Their goal is to strike a balance 
between the competing choice of rule by deliberative elites or non-deliberative masses. 
A random sample of the population is selected to achieve a ‘deliberative microcosm’ of 
the population, with each citizen having an equal chance of being selected. The sample 
then discusses a key issue for several days, as well as cross-examining ‘experts.’136 
These participants are disengaged from the issue and therefore not partisan, and are 
consequently meant to offer ‘universal’ reasons in the debates. In citizen juries the 
number assembled is ten to twenty while in deliberative opinion polls it is a more 
representative several hundred. The concern with citizen juries is a lack of a genuinely 
representative sample, meaning that another jury with a different sample could produce 
an entirely different decision.137 For deliberative opinion polls the problems are 
ensuring small minorities are not excluded138 and mediating effective debate between 
big groups.  
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A significant problem for both institutional mechanisms is that the preferences of the 
rest of the population will still be pre-deliberative as they have not participated in the 
debate and the likelihood is that they will not accept the resulting decisions. This is 
perhaps partially overcome through extensive and varied media coverage of the 
meetings,139,140 however, they still have been excluded from putting forward their own 
arguments and ‘their representatives’ are not open to recourse. This is probably why in 
citizen juries the result is recommendations for decisions and the deliberative opinion 
poll is, exactly as the title suggests, an aggregation of post deliberative preferences with 
no collective decision reached, which means the democratic core of the theory in not 
maintained. Furthermore, the organisers or facilitators also have excessive control, 
which could lead to manipulation of the deliberative process as they get to set the 
agenda by selecting the issues for debate and by selecting the experts to provide 
information.141 
 
Civil society 
 
The final method of institutionalisation to be considered envisions citizens participating 
in collective deliberation through membership of voluntary associations and social 
movements in civil society. These organisations communicate between each other 
forming public spheres, ‘the space in which citizens deliberate about their common 
affairs, and hence an institutionalised arena of discursive interaction.’142 This 
deliberation can potentially influence the opinions of other organisations and the state, 
and help set the agenda for legislation.  
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However, communication in the public sphere can often deviate considerably from the 
deliberative ideal due to inequalities of resources between voluntary associations such 
as money and number and type of members,143,144 which can mean complete 
marginalisation for some associations.145 Moreover, decisions are still being made 
separately from where the deliberation is occurring and ‘unless a direct link can be 
established and maintained between informal deliberation and formal decision-making 
the decisions made cannot realistically benefit from the legitimacy generated by the 
deliberation alone.’146 
   
To overcome this problem Habermas advocates ‘two tracks’ of deliberative decision-
making, the first in the informal arenas of the public sphere and the second in formal 
institutions.147 Parliament would still remain the central focus for decision-making, but 
would make decisions in accordance with the norms of democratic deliberation and be 
supported by decentred deliberation in the public sphere.  The problem remains that 
participants in the public sphere will have influence in deliberation but no power to 
decide, which would still be the privilege of elites located at the centre.148 Decentred 
deliberative forums, which gather representatives from various voluntary associations, 
with decision-making powers have been proposed as a solution.149,150 A potential danger 
of such methods is said to be the co-option of civil society by the state, which would 
cause its deradicalisation and a decrease in the range of opinions included in 
deliberation in the public sphere.151  
 
Following the recent rejuvenation of associational democracy,152,153 decentralisation of 
powers to voluntary associations to fulfil various functions, has been 
advocated.154,155,156,157,158 The associations can then make their own decisions, but this 
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requires them to be internally deliberatively democratic. Currently most voluntary 
associations are hierarchical, with little participation from their members in their 
decisions. It would also require citizens to devote a lot of time to politics, which they 
may not be inclined to do and could exclude citizens affected by the decisions who are 
not members of the association. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Deliberative democracy is an increasingly popular, used and applied theory, which has 
led to increasing contestation and diversity within the theory. While supporters of 
deliberative democracy should welcome much of this, as it increases the theory’s 
vitality and relevance, they should also be cautious about embracing all interpretations 
of the term as this could lead to the eradication of a core necessary to ensure the theory 
does not become meaningless and redundant. This core should always be broad and 
flexible and currently includes: 
 
 the making of collective decisions  
 involving the participation of relevant actors (the more equal this participation 
the more democratic) 
 through the consideration and exchange of reasons 
 aimed at the trans(formation) of preferences  
 
The contests in the theory considered here include the appropriate justification between 
the prudentialists, epistemics and proceduralists, which all have some difficulties, but 
deliberative democracy can encompass this disagreement, but the diversity of views of 
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the nature of public reason seem more significant. Those who suggest that deliberation 
could be hypothetical, solo or dyadic are stretching the core excessively as deliberation 
should be collective if the full benefits of public reason are to be enjoyed and if it is to 
be meaningfully distinguished from purely aggregative conceptions of democracy.  
 
There is further discord over whether public reasons should be universal, appealing to 
all, but it was concluded that inevitably reasons would be context and agent specific, 
even if this is not ideal. Similarly consensus is considered unachievable, especially in 
plural societies, but agonistics further rejected its desirability. Further dissension came 
from communicative democrats who contested the content of deliberation itself. They 
appreciated that a sole focus on reason could disadvantage certain participants, but 
failed to recognise the same failings in their own recommendations. Inevitably though 
the exchange of reasons is an essential element of deliberative democracy, and is part of 
its core. Contestation is also occurring over the scope of reasons, with many wanting to 
eliminate prejudiced and exclusive reasons apriorially from debate. Inevitably this 
exclusion would have to be done undemocratically and could lead to new and 
challenging discourses also being excluded. It was therefore argued that deliberative 
democrats should have faith in the preference transforming processes of public 
deliberation and therefore embrace the inclusion of all reasons. Finally, there are 
extensive disagreements over whether deliberative democracy should and can be 
institutionalised, and a variety of methods were considered, each with their own 
advantages and disadvantages and some much closer to the ideal of deliberative 
democracy than others, but with each promoting different aspects of the deliberative 
core. 
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It is perhaps because deliberative democracy has developed this breadth and depth that 
it has come to dominate discussions on democracy. Currently the idea of deliberative 
democracy still retains a core meaning, and is still fluid enough to enable most of the 
diversity highlighted here. The danger is that the diversity will increase to such a level 
that it will lose this core and become excessively versatile and devoid of meaning. This 
is not to say that the idea of deliberative democracy is fixed or that it ever could be or 
should be as it must continue to adapt to changing empirical circumstances and generate 
innovative and interesting responses to these and perennial problems and contestation 
and adaptability are required to achieve this.  
 
Deliberative democracy is unfinished business and, like democracy, business that will 
never be finished. No theory of democracy should ever be seen as finalised product159 
and therefore deliberative democracy should never be seen as ‘complete’, but some 
boundaries to valid uses and interpretations of it must also be maintained to retain 
relevance and meaning. 
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